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Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between global corporate tax rates and leverage ratios.  
Theory suggests that firms facing a higher tax rate will have more debt, in order to maximize the 
effect of the tax savings provided by interest payments.  This paper analyzes corporations around 
the world, including companies based in the United States.  I show through this data that tax 
rates and leverage ratios do, in fact, have a positively correlated relationship.  The high-leverage, 
high-tax firms should also have lower interest coverage ratios, due to the fact that they will pay 
more in interest because they hold more debt.  These results indicate that the use of leverage as a 
tax benefit is upheld by firms in general. 
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I. Introduction 
 The combination of debt and equity a firm holds is known as capital structure.  
Corporations must weigh the benefits of issuing debt against the costs associated with such an 
issuance.  Debt can be costly, and too much debt can be detrimental to a company.  However, a 
company with little to no debt will benefit largely from issuing bonds.  The benefits appear at tax 
time, due to what is known as the debt tax shield.  A corporation calculates their income tax bill 
after all of their business expenses.  By subtracting interest paid on debt from income, they save 
quite a bit of money.  This is considered to shift wealth to equity holders, which is the primary 
goal of a corporation.   
 The savings in taxes is worthwhile provided it outweighs the cost of issuing the debt, or 
the amount of interest paid to the debt holders.  A firm must also consider the cost of bankruptcy, 
as holding too much debt will increase their chances of going bankrupt.  In countries such as the 
United States, which has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, this use of leverage 
to avoid taxation is often quite beneficial.  Unless a company is over-levered, they will find 
savings in issuing debt and will likely do so.  As found in Faulkender and Smith (2014), 
companies in the United States are even finding savings by extending operations to other 
countries with lower tax rates rather than pay the high U.S. tax rates.  Unless the income earned 
abroad is repatriated, companies will avoid paying taxes at the high U.S. rate.  This lowers the 
corporation’s effective tax rate significantly.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) examined similar 
data with more of a focus on the source of debt, and found that the same trend of increased 
leverage related to tax rates holds. 
 Corporations may fund their activities and investments through the issuance of debt or 
equity, or cash on hand.  Understanding the choices a company makes is vital to empirical 
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researchers and the market.  A low-risk, low-debt firm could be a good investment for a lender 
wishing to diversify their holdings, and could be charged a lower interest rate on a new debt 
issuance.  Knowing the relationship between risk and return and realizing that the use of leverage 
in the United States can be used for the purpose of shielding income from taxation may help 
investors and researchers understand and forecast firm behavior. 
In this paper, I am looking at whether or not the same use of leverage to protect income 
from governmental taxation is practiced globally.  I am examining leverage with the same 
controls as Faulkender and Smith (2014) using a global data set.  The difference is that 
Faulkender and Smith (2014) focuses on companies incorporated in the U.S. and their foreign 
holdings, while I examine companies incorporated around the world.  They examined whether or 
not these companies used their foreign affiliates in the same way, shielding income from lower 
local tax rates through debt as well as avoiding U.S. high tax rates through their foreign 
affiliates.  Their findings indicate that companies are, in fact, using both and show that taxes are 
of a first order concern. 
Understanding the use of leverage is a cornerstone of corporate finance.  Researchers 
need this information to analyze economic policy, banks may use it to help determine interest 
rates and to find new clients and key management in a corporation should be able to determine 
the optimal leverage ratio for the firm.  Comprehending the exploitation of the debt tax shield 
can be beneficial to the entire market.  For example, say a good financial economist went to 
work for a government entity.  If she has a good understanding of this legal form of tax 
minimization, she may be able to help create policies that would beneficial to the United States 
as a whole.  She may realize that a lower corporate tax rate in the U.S. would incentivize 
companies to abandon foreign affiliates and repatriate all funds.  In so doing, they will 
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effectively create more jobs and increase the GDP of the United States.  This would be highly 
beneficial to the country (or market) as a whole, and it all starts with an understanding of what 
the debt tax shield is and who is using it. 
The benefits of using leverage to avoid taxation are high, but it has been repeatedly 
shown that firms do not fully utilize leverage.  Companies in lower tax countries have debt, 
which may or may not be associated with taxes.  However, we see that as tax rates increase, debt 
levels of companies subjected to those tax rates increases simultaneously.  Mean and median 
leverage figures increase steadily with tax rate hikes.  The data reflects that this relationship is 
positive and significant indicating that firms do have higher leverage when operating in countries 
with higher tax rates. 
 
II. Data 
 The data used in this paper comes from COMPUSTAT.  It is a compilation of financial 
reporting data and effective tax rates from 84 different countries.  There are over 280,000 
country-firm-year observations, which span over 1993 to 2013.  The primary objects of concern 
are effective tax rates and leverage.  Leverage is a simple calculation of debt over firm value.  
The dependent variable interest coverage is a ratio that indicates the ability of a firm to make 
interest payments on their debt.  With simultaneous increases in debt and taxes, the interest 
coverage ratio should decrease because of the higher payments required on the additional debt. 
 The other dependent variables that this paper examines are two leverage measures, and 
are expected to have a positive relationship with effective tax rate.  The first, book value 
leverage, is calculated as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the sum of total debt 
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and the book value of shareholders equity.  The net book leverage ratio is the same as above, 
with total debt minus cash in the numerator.  The final measure is related to interest coverage.  
This ratio is expected to have a negative relationship with the effective tax rate, since firms will 
have more debt and therefore be less able to pay their interest payments.  The interest coverage 
ratio is defined as EBITDA divided by interest expense.  The regression in the paper is run on 
the natural log of interest coverage, which is the natural log of 1 plus the interest coverage ratio.  
This was done in Faulkender and Smith (2014) which scales the annual cash flow obligations 
relative to the size of the firm. 
 
III. Results 
 Table 1 shows summary statistics for all of the variables in the data set.  It reflects the 
minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation and sample size for each of the 
dependent and independent variables.  This table gives a brief overview of what is contained in 
the sample.  It is interesting to note that the net book leverage minimum and maximum are 
almost symmetrical around zero, but the mean and median are quite far from those values.  Also, 
the range in values of the natural log of interest coverage is quite wide, indicating less 
consistency in that ratio.   
The first column in table 2 contains summary statistics of leverage related to the effective 
tax rate for the entire data set.  All ratios have been winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles, 
respectively.  I have also removed negative and zero leverage.  The data is separated into 
quartiles by effective tax rate.  The first quartile, with the lowest mean and median tax rates, also 
contains firms with the lowest mean and median leverage to firm value ratio.  The fourth quartile 
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has the highest mean and median tax rates, as well as the highest leverage ratios.  Leverage and 
tax rates for the two middle firms also increase by quartile. Thus, these summary statistics show 
that with higher tax rates many corporations do, in fact, have more debt.  As expected, with tax 
rate increases leverage ratios also tend to increase.  This indicates that corporations do use debt 
as a tax shield, especially when they face high tax rates. 
 The second column of table 2 shows the interactive summary statistics for the interest 
coverage ratio related to the effective tax rate.  The first quartiles show a low tax rate and a high 
interest coverage ratio.  As we move down along each quartile, the tax rates increase and the 
interest coverage ratios decrease as expected.  The fourth quartile, however, shows a spike in the 
interest coverage ratio.  This is not intuitive, as these firms are shown to have more debt, and 
should therefore be less able to cover their interest payments.  This is, however, only a summary 
statistic, and the results may hold as expected when controlling for access to the external market.  
The regression run below shows a positive relationship, so this anomaly in the last quartile may 
be strong enough to skew the results. 
 Table 3 shows the leverage book value, net book leverage and natural log of interest 
coverage regressions run with between effects.  It is done this way because the between 
regressions average out the time component, which shows the results essentially as cross-
sectional without a time variable.  The time variable may cause relational errors, and where we 
don’t expect companies to change their country of operation often, it makes sense to view the 
results as cross-sectional. 
 The first column of table 3 shows the results from the book value leverage regression.  
These results indicate a positive relationship between effective tax rates and leverage, consistent 
with corporate finance theory, Faulkender and Smith (2015), and my hypothesis in this study.  
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The regression gave a high t-statistic, so it is highly significant.  This regression is also indicative 
of a positive relationship between book value leverage and sales, which makes sense.  It would 
seem that firms with higher sales would be able to take on more debt.  The coefficient on PP&E 
is also significantly positive.   
 The second column in table 3 shows the results from the regression on net book leverage.  
These results also indicate a positive relationship between leverage and tax rates.  This is 
consistent with the results of the other regression and the expectations of this and other papers.  
The relationship between leverage and sales is again positive, along with PP&E.  These results 
are consistent with the book value leverage regression, and further validate the inferences made 
about these relationships. 
 The final column in table 3 lists the results from the between effect regression on interest 
coverage.  These results are just the opposite of the summary statistics relating interest coverage 
to tax rates.  We see a positive coefficient on effective tax rate in this regression.  This indicates 
that as tax rates increase, raising leverage ratios with it, the ability of the firms to pay back all of 
their interest payments on this debt also increase.  Theory suggests that the relationship should be 
just the opposite, and this regression contradicts that and the summary statistics. Possible reasons 
for this discrepancy are errors across the time variable and the anomaly in the fourth quartile.  
Sales and interest coverage have a positive relationship in this regression.  This makes sense 
because as sales increase, a firm will have more of an ability to pay back the interest on their 
debts.  However, the coefficient on sales is not very high in this regression.  Also, the coefficient 
on property, plant and equipment is negative.   
Table 4 shows the regression results on book value leverage using OLS.  This results in a 
positive, yet insignificant, coefficient on effective tax rates.  The OLS regressions on the other 
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dependent variables brought about coefficients of opposite signage from the between effect 
regressions.   This is inconsistent with the interactive results and the between effect regressions.  
These mixed results for the interest coverage regressions may be due to the fourth quartile, where 
the interest coverage ratio breaks pattern and increases in the highest tax bracket.  The 
discrepancies in the net book leverage and insignificance in the book value leverage results may 
be related to an error in the data.  I ran multiple regressions to account for various different 
factors.  I included year dummies, removed year dummies, clustered the results by gvkey or 
country and tried different combinations of these things.  My hypothesis is that the unbalanced 
nature of the time series within the cross-sectional data is causing the problem.  That would 
explain why the between effect regressions hold the trend as expected, but OLS does not.  The 
between effect regressions average out the time factor, and therefore yield proper results. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The results shown in the between effect regressions on leverage substantiate the 
hypothesis in this paper and those of Faulkender and Smith (2015).  It is quite clear that there is a 
positive relationship between the tax rates that companies face and their debt to firm value ratio.  
The best theoretical explanation for this, validated by the data, is that firms are using debt to 
shield a portion of their income from being taxed by the government.  Debt is a great instrument 
to use for this purpose because interest payments are subtracted before income taxes are 
calculated.  The more debt a company has, the less they will pay in taxes because less income 
will be subject to taxation.  Firms will want to prevent over-levering their operation, which will 
have detrimental effects on the firm overall, as it will dramatically increase their likelihood of 
9 
 
bankruptcy and therefore increase their cost of leverage.  Optimal capital structure balances the 
tax benefit of leverage with the cost of bankruptcy. 
 The interest coverage results, however, do not support these beliefs.  As taxes rise, 
leverage rises.  This should increase interest expense and therefore decrease the interest coverage 
ratio.  Interest expense is the denominator of the interest expense ratio, so as it increases, the 
ratio overall should decrease.  The regression, however, shows just the opposite.  This may be 
due to errors in the time variable or the fourth quartile anomaly.  These discrepancies are 
interesting, and should be explored further in a paper that researches this at a deeper level.   
 The contribution of this paper is that it shows that this positive relationship between 
leverage and tax rates across multiple countries of incorporation.  Faulkender and Smith (2014) 
show that this trend holds within multinational corporations based in the United States, but has 
not looked beyond those borders at the rest of the world.  In their working paper, Faulkender and 
Smith (2015) will look at the global trend, based on the same data used in this study.  This paper 
will give them a starting place for evidence of a basic trend that they will then expand on. 
 The evidence in this paper is reliant on between effect regressions.  This is sensible 
because these regressions average out the time component and shows the results as a time-
averaged OLS.  If the time component can be fixed or controlled, like it is in the between effect 
regressions, the trend holds significantly between leverage and taxes.  The p-values from these 
regressions are quite low.  The results may be stronger with more data, more time, or a better 
time measure.  This paper does have enough evidence, though, to support a likely trend 
worldwide.  The theory that corporate tax rates do play a role in capital structure is supported by 
this paper, among many others, and is therefore probable, not only for corporations based in the 
United States, but those all over the world as well. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard deviation of each variable.  The variables have 
all been winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles. 
 
 
  Min Max Mean Median St Dev Observations 
Book Value Leverage  0.000 0.8008 0.3216 0.3023 0.2471 288,344 
Net Book Leverage -0.6679 0.6975 0.0959 0.1435 0.3689 288,321 
ln Interest Coverage -0.0040 5.7886 2.4405 2.1428 1.4710 236,280 
Effective Tax Rate  0.1700 0.5160 0.3256 0.3140 0.0836 289,423 
ln Sales -0.8074 12.7734 6.7029 6.6444 3.5619 289,407 
PP&E  0.0227 0.7369 0.3051 0.2907 0.2082 289,413 
Return on Assets -0.1646 0.1926 0.0423 0.0481 0.0824 288,607 
Depreciation  0.0049 0.0902 0.0347 0.0312 0.0229 268,392 
Dividends (Dummy)  0.000 1.000 0.8873 1.000 0.3162 289,423 
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Table 2 
Interactive Variables Summary 
Table 2 presents the interactive summary statistics by quartile.  The first section shows the positive relationship 
between leverage and tax rates.  This shows the trend of increasing tax leverage as tax rates increase.  The leverage 
is calculated as total debt of the firm divided by the firm value.  This ratio is winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 
percentiles.   
The second section shows the negative relationship between the interest coverage ratio and tax rates, until the fourth 
quartile.  This shows that as taxes and leverage increase, the interest coverage ratio decreases, with the anomaly of 
the last quartile.  The interest coverage ratio was calculated as EBITDA divided by interest expense.  The results 
presented here are actually related to the natural log of interest coverage, which is calculated as ln(1 + interest 
coverage ratio).  These ratios are also winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles. 
 
 Leverage  ln Interest Coverage 
Quartile 
Tax 
Rates 
Mean 
Leverage 
Median 
Leverage 
 Tax   
Rates 
Mean                              
ln Int Cov 
Median   
ln Int Cov 
1 0.2227 0.2266   0.25  0.2227 2.3411 2.1206 
2 0.2955 0.2954   0.30  0.2955 2.1792 1.9716 
3 0.3435 0.3435   0.34  0.3435 2.0422 1.8936 
4 0.4419 0.4408   0.43  0.4419 2.5287 2.3238 
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Table 3 
Between Effect Regressions 
Table 3 presents the results of the between effects regressions on book value leverage, net book leverage and the 
natural log of interest coverage.  The first section displays the results from the regression on book value leverage.  It 
shows the positive, significant coefficient of the effective tax rate.  The second section shows the results from the 
regression on net book leverage.  It, too, shows the positive, significant coefficient of the effective tax rate.  The 
final column shows the results from the ln interest coverage regression.   
Book value leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total debt plus shareholder’s equity.  Net book leverage is 
calculated the same as book leverage, except with total debt minus cash and marketable securities in the numerator.  
The ln interest coverage is calculated as the natural log of one plus the interest coverage ratio, which is calculated as 
EBITDA divided by interest expense.  The independent variables are as follows: lnsales is just the natural log of 
sales, ppeb is property, plant and equipment, calculated as PP&E divided by total assets, roa is the return on assets, 
calculated as EBIT divided total assets, depr is the depreciation variable, calculated as depreciation divided by total 
assets and divs is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm paid dividends that year.  All of these 
dependent and independent variables have been winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles. 
The regression models are as follows: 
𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡    
  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 ln 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
 Book Value Leverage Net Book Leverage ln Interest Coverage 
efftaxrate 0.2165*** 
(0.0164) 
0.2317*** 
(0.0241) 
0.2217** 
(0.0922) 
lnsales 0.0179*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0215*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0229*** 
(0.0023) 
ppeb 0.2495*** 
(0.0064) 
0.6266*** 
(0.0095) 
-1.3655*** 
(0.0373) 
roa -0.3980*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.3625*** 
(0.0261) 
13.8041*** 
(0.1290) 
depr 0.5612*** 
(0.0621) 
0.6721*** 
(0.0915) 
6.5863*** 
(0.3556) 
divs -0.0081* 
(0.0043) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0064) 
0.2032*** 
(0.0241) 
N 266,664 266,655 222,441 
R² 0.1208 0.1728 0.2912 
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Table 4 
OLS Regression Results 
Table 4 shows the results from the OLS regression on book value leverage.  It shows the positive, yet insignificant 
coefficient of the effective tax rate.  Book value leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total debt plus 
shareholder’s equity.  The independent variables are as follows: lnsales is just the natural log of sales, ppeb is 
property, plant and equipment, calculated as PP&E divided by total assets, roa is the return on assets, calculated as 
EBIT divided total assets, depr is the depreciation variable, calculated as depreciation divided by total assets and 
divs is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm paid dividends that year.  The dependent and 
independent variables have been winsorized at the 95
th
 and 5
th
 percentiles. 
 
The model: 
𝐵𝑉 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑏𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟5𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟6𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟7𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟8𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟9𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟11𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟12𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟13𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽20𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟14𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟15𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟16𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟17𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽24𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟18𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟19𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽26𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟20𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  
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Book                    
Value             
Leverage 
efftaxrate 0.0103 
(0.0066) 
lnsales 0.0187*** 
(0.0001) 
ppeb 0.2188*** 
(0.0023) 
roa -0.4537*** 
(0.0058) 
depr 0.4985*** 
(0.0209) 
divs -0.0267*** 
(0.0014) 
y1 Omitted 
 
y2 -0.0109 
(0.0074) 
y3 -0.0093 
(0.0072) 
y4 -0.0008 
(0.0064) 
y5 0.0054 
(0.0060) 
y6 0.0040 
(0.0059) 
y7 0.0033 
(0.0058) 
y8 -0.0102 
(0.0058) 
y9 -0.0128** 
(0.0058) 
y10 -0.0141** 
(0.0057) 
y11 -0.0136** 
(0.0057) 
y12 -0.0165*** 
(0.0057) 
y13 -0.0183*** 
(0.0057) 
y14 -0.0351*** 
(0.0057) 
y15 -0.0406*** 
(0.0057) 
y16 -0.0346*** 
(0.0057) 
y17 -0.0445*** 
(0.0057) 
y18 -0.0536*** 
(0.0057) 
y19 -0.0567*** 
(0.0057) 
y20 -0.0474*** 
(0.0057) 
